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TThe article is structured as follows. First, I will make a difference between my main statements and those that simonovits attributes to me. Then, I will demonstrate that simonovits 
only shows a very specific case of my model 
with his own models, and not even the 
problems I focus on. After that, I will show 
what simonovits should have demonstrated, 
then what the solution I recommend actually 
is – of course, within a framework that the 
model of simonovits does not make at all 
possible.E-mail address:  jozsef.banyar@uni-corvinus.hu
József  Banyár
The Point of the Message  
is Something different 
Comments on the article of andrás Simonovits entitled: 
Family allowance and Pension dependent  
on the number of Children: optimality and neutrality
Summary: The polemic article of András Simonovits , published in the current issue (Simonovits, 2020), was particularly fast: he 
reacted to my paper published in the previous issue – even before its publication – by always showing me the current stage of his 
article while he was continuously elaborating it, and sometimes (but generally not) taking my comments and recommendations. 
The reason why I can respond so fast to his article published herein is that he immediately shared with me the final version 
accepted by the quarterly, for which I am thankful to him. The article does not contain any particular criticism. Actually, it illustrates 
the extreme cases of my theory and adds some subtlety, which is achieved by the introduction of child specific consumption φ. His 
main problem is that I do not substantiate my message with a mathematical model, and that with my article I distract the attention 
from other more important topics. We can argue about the usefulness of mathematical models; I think I will need them at a later 
stage of the detailed explanation of my theory, but at this stage they would only be impediments. As far as the diversion of attention 
is concerned, that is clearly a misconception. In my response article, I will demonstrate that the point of my message is something 
totally different from what Simonovits thinks it is, and also that my point is difficult to grasp with his model. The essential difference 
is that I do not primarily address the lifetime optimisation of individual consumption (including the pension system), but the 
contradictions of the pension system. Nonetheless, I will try to present my actual statements. 
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My reAl STATeMeNTS ANd HoW 
SIMoNovITS reWroTe THeM
simonovits makes it look like that the main 
difference between him and me is that I want 
to recognize and support child-rearing with 
pension, while he wants to do the same with 
family allowance. his whole article is based 
on this distinction. This is such a rough 
simplification of my message that it is already 
falsification. For this reason, I will briefly 
summarise what I am actually saying, which 
is much richer than what he suggests, and 
furthermore its point is something completely 
different.
My main statement is that the current 
pension system, the so called a pay-as-you-go 
(pAYG) system, is defective in principle and 
therefore requires fundamental correction. 
The point of this correction should involve 
reversing the system to its implicit basis: 
investment in human capital. Therefore, there 
is an internal logical connection between 
the public pension system and child-rearing, 
which is not reflected by the current defective 
system. This has highly detrimental effects on 
both the pension system and fertility.
The pAYG system distributes the 
contributions paid by the generations after the 
pensioners amongst retired persons in the form 
of pension. In essence, this system lives on 
the “returns” on investment of human capital 
accumulated in future generations, but its 
yield (plus the repayment of invested capital) 
is not distributed among the stakeholders 
(i.e. the contribution is not converted into 
allowance that way) according to the ratio 
of the contribution of each individual to this 
investment, but based on a very different 
principle, namely, according to the amount of 
contribution paid by the individuals into the 
system in their active period. The defect is that 
the devotees of the pAYG system discovered 
a superficial similarity between this systems 
based on human capital and the traditionally 
funded systems, where it is really the payment 
that is the ultimate source of the pension after 
being invested. In the pAYG system, however, 
the function of the contribution is something 
totally different: it is not the investment 
side but the returns side (i.e. it is wrong to 
consider it as a payment giving rise to rights, 
as it is the repayment by the child raised). The 
investment here is child-rearing and all the 
costs associated with it. Not considering child-
rearing as the investment of the system results 
in the stakeholders not being able to recover 
the expenses of child-rearing. In other words, 
child-rearing becomes a “bad deal” for them, 
and they will only do it if they can afford it. 
Therefore, this investment of fundamental 
importance for the society becomes luxury 
consumption. No wonder that fewer and 
fewer people will raise such an expensive thing 
at home, and that they will rather switch 
to owning a dog or a cat, which is cheaper. 
In addition, the fact that the payment of 
contributions is made the basis of pension will 
result in people measuring the rate of their 
pension to the payment of contribution, while 
the two have nothing to do with one another. 
Indeed, they can receive as much pension – 
regardless of how much contribution they 
paid – as the contribution that active persons 
can pay right now, that is, the possible pension 
will only depend on the number of children 
raised and their ability to pay contribution. 
It follows from the foregoing that the pAYG 
pension system should be transformed in a 
way that:
•	the pension will only be due in proportion 
of the efforts to raise children. That is to 
say, pension will depend on the number 
and “quality” of children, i.e. their 
ability to pay contribution. This latter 
can be measured, for example, with the 
educational attainment of the child; 
•	nothing is due for contribution, because it 
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is on the returns side, but it is compulsory 
to pay, because this is how everyone pays 
back the costs of their raising;
•	the pension is not only due to those 
directly raising the child, because 
child-rearing is partially financed from 
taxes. school education, health care, 
the different allowances provided to 
the parents (family housing support 
programme, tax allowance etc.) are such 
parts financed from taxes, and yes, also 
family allowance. The latter is the only 
one recognized by simonovits as such – 
obviously mistakenly, but according to the 
logics of the simple model that he applies 
legitimately, because it is the only thing 
that his model can handle;
•	those who do no raise children must put 
aside the money saved by not raising a 
child, so that they can supplement their 
pension from this money put aside to the 
level of those with children.
Thus, on the whole, it has to be achieved 
that child-rearing becomes a recoverable deal, 
which is – ultimately – financed by the raised 
child himself/herself in the form of pension 
contribution. If this is achieved, it will not 
matter how many children are raised, because 
there will always be pension; the only question 
that remains is to what extent pension 
derives from savings and to what extent from 
investment in human capital.
In the system described it is also irrelevant 
to what extent child-rearing is financed from 
taxes and to what extent exclusively from the 
efforts of the parents. If mainly from taxes, 
then a larger part of the contribution will be 
distributed in proportion to tax payment even 
among childless persons; if, however, it is not 
at all financed from taxes, childless persons 
will not receive pension from the children’s 
contribution. (And here it is important to 
mention another thing. The objective of the 
system I recommend is not to encourage more 
and more people to have children, but to 
create a logical and sustainable pension system 
instead of the current silly and inadequate 
system. The system itself will be okay with 
ANY number of children, i.e. it will be 
ChILD NEUTrAL – contrary to the current 
one preferred by simonovits, which assumes 
and requires the existence of many children, 
but encourages to have few children.)
here, we should return to what simonovits 
simplified my message to. he thinks that my 
main statement is that I want child-rearing 
100 percent financed by the parents, and 
he wants child-rearing which is 100 percent 
financed from taxes. This is not true: I am 
talking about something totally different! 
I consider it self-evident that, for example, 
school should not be paid by the parents 
but by the taxpayers. I have nothing against 
family allowance or any other child benefit 
either. But I do state that these things are 
far from compensating the efforts of the 
parents associated with child-rearing (they 
just do so in a proportion of approximately 
30-40 percent), and that it is even essentially 
impossible to achieve 100 percent. The reason 
is the difference in the parents’ financial 
positions. I envisage a system where the 
average expenses of child-rearing and not 
the actual individual efforts are reimbursed, 
because the latter is impossible and not even 
desirable. In contrast, simonovits thinks 
that it is possible; what is more, he goes even 
further by making the surprising statement 
that this is what is happening today, too! 
however, it makes sense why simonovits 
simplified my statements. What I am saying 
here can only be illustrated in a multi-periodic 
model, but simonovits chose the simplest one-
periodic model, which is inadequate to model 
these problems, so only simple problems can 
be demonstrated with it. They, however, do 
not contradict my theory, only illustrate it. 
Let’s look at it in more details.
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THe ModelS oF SIMoNovITS  
AS SPecIAl (ANd IrrelevANT) cASeS
simonovits makes a big deal about an 
utterly simple model, but his message can 
be summarised very briefly. he assumes that 
life consists of three stages (childhood, active 
adulthood, retired old age), where a person 
should live on the (uniformly) 1 income earned 
in the active period in their whole life. some 
people have children, others don’t, but the 
average number of children per adult is 1, so 
the population is stationary. The consumption 
of the child is φ times the adult’s consumption. 
people seek to smooth their consumption, so 
they want to consume as much in their old 
age as in their young (active) age. This is called 
by him optimality. he examines the different 
transfer systems according to whether the 
consumption of persons with children and 
those without children is equal in them. If it 
is, then what he calls neutrality is achieved.
It is obvious that under these conditions 
one individual on average consumes 1 in their 
whole life (what they earn in their young 
active age), which they must divide into 2+φ 
parts if their consumption is optimal. That 
is to say, their consumption in adulthood is 
1/(2+φ) per period. (simonovits “suspects” 
this in a theorem, then also “proves” it.) If 
the transfers are able to ensure this, neutrality 
will be achieved. If there are no transfers, then 
not; in this case the consumption of childless 
persons will be ½, and that of persons with 
children will be 1/(2+nφ), where n represents 
the number of children of persons with 
children. This is obviously not a neutral case.
After that, he “plays” with how to name the 
transfers. If they are called family allowance, 
persons with children will receive just as 
much from childless people to raise their 
consumption to the average level of 1/(2+φ), 
and that of childless persons will reduce to 
the same level. This corresponds to the case 
in my theory, where all burdens of child-
rearing are financed from public charges. 
Then simonovits examines if it is possible 
to reimburse child-rearing costs exclusively 
in the form of pension. he concludes that 
it is only possible if nφ ≤1, otherwise family 
allowance is also necessary. This can also be 
readily accepted (I am not following here 
either simonovits’s superfluously complicated 
train of thoughts, because actually he is saying 
a very simple thing) as at this point it will not 
be true anymore that the total expenditures 
of persons with children spent on children 
are still lower than or equal to their adult 
consumption. If, however, the consumption of 
the children exceeds this limit, and the person 
with children gets back their expenditure 
spent on the children in their old age, then 
they will get back more than what their active 
age consumption was, so the requirement of 
smoothing consumption, i.e. optimality will 
not be met. This problem can be avoided 
by giving family allowance to persons with 
children, at least partly.
This is totally fine, but does not work 
well as criticism, because it has never been 
my objective that not family allowance, but 
pension should be given – only simonovits said 
this to have something to criticise. Therefore, 
what he is saying can only be considered as a – 
superfluously overcomplicated – illustration of 
my message in very specific cases.
however, the actual point of my message 
cannot be presented by the tools outlined in 
simonovits’s article, as: 
there are not any different consecutive 
periods in his model, while the point of 
my message is linked to the money flowing 
through periods,
through his abstractions (stationary 
population in particular) he considers the 
problem that I want to addressed (from 
the aspect of the pension system), namely 
that there are not enough children (i.e. the 
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population decreases at an ever faster rate) a 
priori solved. 
I try to demonstrate below what I thought 
of by using the markings of simonovits. I will 
focus on two things: 
what is actually happening in today’s 
pension system (and it is not what simonovits 
suggests!), 
what would happen by comparison in 
the system I recommend (I will demonstrate 
this through a very simple case).
I am using the same markings (and 
assumptions – for example, lifetime earnings 
is 1 for each person, and everyone dies in their 
old age etc.) as simonovits, supplemented by 
three others:
G: number of children within the population,
A: number of active persons within the 
population,
O: number of the old people (pensioners) 
within the population, 
cL: active age consumption of childless 
persons,
dL: old age consumption of childless persons, 
cH: active age consumption of persons with 
children,
dH: old age consumption of persons with 
children,
f: percentage of persons with children 
within the population,
n: number of children per one parent in 
case of persons with children,
φ: the consumption of the child as a 
percentage of the adult’s consumption,
θ: special tax on childlessness,
τ: pension contribution,
sL: pension savings of childless persons,
bL: state pension of childless persons.
INTereSTINg cASeS deMoNSTrATed 
by uSINg THe ToolS oF SIMoNovITS
What is actually happening in today’s 
system?
Initial values of the parameters in Table 1: 
G1 = A1 = O1. 
Tax on childlessness is θ, which is – in 
contrast with the statement of simonovits – 
much lower than the value φ2+ φ belonging to 
the stable population, ensuring equilibrium. 
I will mark the difference of the two with p, 
because it represents the extra consumption of 
childless persons. I.e. θ = φ  – p2+ φ , and I will 
consider it constant. I will determine the initial 
pension contribution (τ1) so that optimality 
is achieved for childless persons, that is, their 
retired and old age consumption are identical. 
As for them cL
1 = 1 – θ  – τ1 and we want that 
dL
1 = τ1 also equals cL
1, therefore
1– 
φ
+ p
τ1 = 
1– θ
= 2+φ = 1  + p  .2 2 2+φ 2
Table 1
Cash flows in today's pension system
period G A O n cL dL cH dH sL bL
1 G1= A1 = O1 n1 = 1/f cL
1 dL
1 = τ cH
1 τ1 0 0
2 G2<G1 A2 = G1 = A1 O2 = A1 = O1 n2 < n1 cL
2 = cL
1 dL
2 < dL
1 cH
2 > cH
1 τ2 = τ1 0 0
3 G3<G2 A3 = G2 < A2 O3 = A2 < O2 n3 < n2 cL
3 = cL
2 dL
3 < dL
2 cH
3 > cH
2 τ3 = τ2 0 0
4 G4<G3 A4 = G3 < A3 O4 = A3 < O2 n4 < n3 cL
4 = cL
3 dL
4 < dL
3 cH
4 > cH
3 τ4 = τ3 0 0
Source: edited by the author
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Therefore, as they save p per capita by not 
raising rearing, this can de divided equally 
between the active and old age consumption of 
childless persons. Therefore, their consumption 
will be higher than it would be in equilibrium, 
when the inequality between those with 
children and those without children is equalised 
by the tax on childlessness, and when the total 
costs of child-rearing are spread out between 
active people, whether they have children or 
not. I interpret this in my article by saying 
that the society drains money from investment 
into children, and spends it on consumption. 
I did not mention this in my original article, 
but I would like to note here that this is a bad 
strategy for two reasons: firstly, because this way 
it is not ensured there is an adequate number 
of active people who will later take care of my 
pension, and secondly, because we will get used 
to a higher consumption level in active age – 
compared with the equilibrium – (we quasi 
raise our consumption reference point) which 
we would like to achieve in our old age, too.
Therefore, due to the deficiency in p the 
consumption of persons with children will be 
lower than that of childless persons, as follows: 
cH
1 = 1 –  
φn1  – τ + θ 
1 – f
 = 1 – θ – τ  2+φ f
– ( φn1  – θ ).2+φ f
I.e. the deficiency in consumption of 
persons with children compared with that of 
childless persons 
φn1  – 
θ
=  n1×
φ
 – 
1
× ( φ  – p) 2+φ f 2+φ f 2+φ
= (n1 – 1 ) × φ + 1 × p.f 2+φ f
It is positive, as in case of stationary po-
pu lation n1 –
1  = 0f , so then deficiency in 
consumption is 1  × pf . By comparison, in 
the equation of the consumption of persons 
with children only one element will change, 
ni (as this is the only parameter controlled 
by persons with children), in a way that it 
continuously decreases, that is, the active 
age consumption of persons with children 
grows impressively as the number of children 
decreases. As – following simonovits – the 
income and pension contribution of persons 
with children is the same as those of childless 
persons, the pension of those with children 
will be of the same level as well, that is, in 
their case optimality will not be achieved – 
they consume more in their old age than in 
their young age. Nevertheless, this can be 
questioned, of course. Actually, we should 
assume that the income of persons with 
children is also lower than that of childless 
persons, because they must spend part of 
their time raising children – a part increasing 
in proportion to the number of children – 
due to which they can do less work, so their 
income will be lower. For this reason, their 
active age consumption will be even less 
than calculated previously, and their old age 
consumption will be also lower than that of 
childless persons. We will not model this here.
so we will stick to the assumption that 
persons with children have the same income, 
but their active age consumption is lower than 
that of childless persons, so those with children 
decide to raise fewer and fewer children from 
period to period, so the following will be true: 
n1 > n2 > n3 …
Although with this their active age 
consumption grows from period to period, 
the number of children will decrease at an 
accelerating rate from period to period: 
G2 = A2 fn2 , G3 = A3 fn3 = A2 f  
2n2n3 …
however, if we assume that pension 
contribution is unchanged, then pension 
(which is still identical for persons with and 
without children) will also decrease more and 
more rapidly, as the distributable contribution 
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decreases as the number of children decreases, 
while the number of elderly people follows this 
decrease after some delay. The entire process 
will reach an equilibrium when from the level 
necessary for the natural replacement the 
number of children decreases significantly to 
the level where this reduced family allowance 
can also ensure that persons with children 
reach the level of the active age consumption of 
childless persons. Then, the number of children 
stabilises, and the low pension (lower than the 
pension contribution) stabilises as well.
The system can protect itself against this 
in only one way: increasing the contribution 
from period to period, that is: τ1 < τ2 < τ3…. If 
this happens, it can be achieved that retired 
age consumption will not be lower than the 
active age consumption (of childless persons), 
but this active age consumption itself will also 
decrease, although it will be still higher than 
that of persons with children. The increasingly 
high pension contribution will, however, 
encourage even more those with children to 
have fewer and fewer children, therefore, 
at this point the number of children will be 
reduced at the same rate as before, from period 
to period, just at an even higher pace. 
of course, as a solution simonovits suggested 
that we should determine θ in a way that it 
compensates all the expenses associated with 
child-rearing. When calculating in his writing 
how much θ this would be, after stating that: 
“At this stage we model the pension system valid 
in Hungary at the moment”, that can be easily 
interpreted in a way that he thinks that the 
full reimbursement of the expenses of child-
rearing is already achieved today in hungary, 
and the author does not even try later to dispel 
the appearance of this. however, not at all, we 
are a really long way from that. What is more, 
the 100 percent reimbursement of expenses 
can only be achieved in a theoretical model 
like this. 
so here is what I am saying.
What would happen in the system that  
I recommend?
The values of the initial period will be the 
same as before: i.e. the number of children 
for the stationary population, and a tax on 
childlessness, which does not cover all the 
costs of child-rearing. It is the same as it was 
before: θ = φ  – p2+ φ . In my theory, pension 
contribution is the repayment of child-rearing 
costs, and that is obvious in the model, so 
pension contribution is also unambiguous in 
my model (and that is why it is constant from 
period to period): τ = φ2+ φ  .
1 This is, however, 
distributed between persons with children and 
persons without children as pension according 
to the child-rearing efforts.
Let’s look at the first period. We assume that 
at this time and before this time population 
was just stationary, that is, the total number 
of children corresponded to the number of 
active persons. The expenses associated with 
A1 number of active persons was A1 ×
φ
2+ φ  at 
the time, of which amount the percentage of 
childless persons was the tax on childlessness 
(which can actually be interpreted as a uniform 
tax applicable to everyone – only the formula 
has to be rearranged a little bit for this), the 
total value of which is
A0×(1 – f )×( φ  – p) .2+ φ
The rest is the contribution of persons 
with children. As now A0 = O1, of this amount φ  – p2+ φ  “childless pension” is received by one 
pensioner of the first period, to use the term 
of simonovits. As in their active age childless 
persons did not use up p (or half of it) which 
they did not pay for child-rearing, they put 
it aside (sL), and furthermore, they also save 
the amount by which pension contribution 
is now reduced. Their consumption in their 
active age is 
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cL
0 = 1 – θ – τ – sL = 1 –( φ  – p) – φ  – sL2 + φ 2 + φ
= 1  ,2 + φ
which allows us to determine how much they 
put aside as pension savings: 
1– φ
 + p = sL2 + φ .
For this reason, their old age consumption 
(sL + bL) will be the same amount as their 
young age consumption: 12 + φ , so optimality 
is achieved.
Active age consumption of persons with 
children was 
ch
0 = 1 – τ –
φn0 + θ
1–f
 of,2 + φ f
which 
φn0 – θ
1 – f
2 + φ f  
 was their child-rearing contribution. They have 
to get back this amount in the form of pension. 
As a verification, the following relationship 
should be satisfied: the contribution of persons 
without children + persons with children = the 
repayment of adult children, that is:
A0×(1–f )×( φ  – p)+A0×f ×( φn0 – θ 1–f ) 2+ φ 2+φ f
= A1×
φ
2+ φ
By transforming the left side we obtain: 
A0×[(1–f )×( φ  – p) + f × n0× φ  2+φ 2+φ
– ( φ – p) × (1 – f )] = A0 × f × n0 × φ  .2+φ 2+φ
And as here A0  = A1, and f × n0 = 1, it equals 
the right side.
This pension of persons with children can 
be converted into another formula:
φn0 – θ
1–f
=
φn0 –
φ 1 – f
+
1 – f
× p 2+φ f 2+φ 2+φ f f
=
φ
× (n0 – 1 – f ) + 1 – f × p  .2+φ f f
And immediately, we can establish that 
it is not likely to correspond to the active 
age consumption of persons with children, 
which is:
cH
0 = 1 –  
φn0  – τ + θ 
1 – f
 = 1 – 
φn0 –
φ
2+φ f 2+φ 2+φ
+( φ – p)× 1 – f = 1 – φn0 – φ + φ2+φ f 2+φ 2+φ 2+φ
2 –φ× (n0 – 1 – f  ) 
–×
1 – f
–
1 – f
× p = 
f 1 – f  × p.f f 2+φ f
At the same time, it is clear that the sum 
of their active and old age consumption is the 
same as that of childless persons:
2 –φ× (n0 – 1 – f  ) 
–f 1 – f  × p +
φ × (n0 – 1 – f ) 2+φ f 2+φ f
+
1 – f
× p =
2
 ,f 2+φ
that is, the scenario where money is 
withdrawn from child-rearing and then 
spent on consumption does not occur in my 
theory. With this formula, one of the main 
requirements of simonovits, i.e. neutrality is 
fulfilled in my theory, so persons with children 
consume the same quantity as childless 
persons.
It is not certain, however, that optimality is 
fulfilled, which is another main requirement 
of simonovits, i.e. that we consume the same 
in old age than in active age. But! If we think 
about it, we do not have any reason to assume 
that our old age consumption corresponds to 
the childhood consumption of our children 
that we financed. of course, there can be 
such a case, where the old age consumption 
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of persons with children will be precisely the 
equilibrium value (and therefore equal to the 
young age consumption):
φ × (n0 – 1 – f ) + 1 – f × p = 1  .2+φ f f 2+φ
There are several variable parameters here. 
p is set by the government, and n is set by the 
families themselves. If we express the previous 
formula for p, we obtain that value p ensuring 
optimality is the following:
p =
1 – φ × (n0 – 1 – f ) .f × f1 – f 2+φ
If p is lower than this, young age 
consumption will he higher than old age 
consumption; if higher, then the other way 
around. so, policy has some freedom of 
action. A small p otherwise means a high tax 
on childlessness and a high family allowance. 
Although by this we derogate from optimality, 
there is nothing to prevent that persons with 
children – similarly to childless persons – will 
also put this young age extra money aside 
on a savings account for their old age, and 
thus achieve the smoothing of consumption. 
Which – if we think about it – is self-evident 
given that the abstraction of simonovits 
that each person with children has the same 
number of children is certainly not true. This 
means that persons with children must have 
a savings account if they have fewer than the 
average number of children.
Theoretically, the question is more 
complicated if p is high, so family allowance 
is not sufficient. At this point, the young age 
consumption of persons with children will be 
lower than old age consumption, therefore, 
the described solution cannot be applied. 
Then, persons with children – if they are really 
motivated to smooth consumption between 
the periods – can choose the appropriate 
conversion of parameter n. (here it should 
be noted that the formula will be even more 
complicated, as we assume there that point 
n ensures the replacement of the population, 
which they will clearly derogate from if the 
stakeholders “guess” their old age standard of 
living with this. But actually, based on all this, 
this more complicated formula is also easily 
deductible.)
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